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4 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper analyzes the consequences for financial performance of technology strategies 
categorized along two dimensions: (1) explorative versus exploitative and (2) solitary versus 
collaborative. The financial performance implications of firms’ positioning along these two 
dimensions has important managerial implications, but has received only limited attention in 
prior studies. Drawing on organizational learning theory and technology alliances literature, a set 
of hypotheses on the performance implications of firms’ technology strategies are derived. These 
hypotheses are tested empirically on a panel dataset (1996-2003) of 168 R&D-intensive firms 
based in Japan, the US and Europe and situated in five different industries (chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, ICT, electronics, non-electrical machinery). Patent data are used to construct 
indicators of explorative versus exploitative technological activities (activities in new or existing 
technology domains) and collaborative versus solitary technological activities (joint versus single 
patent ownership). The financial performance of firms is measured via a market value indicator: 
Tobin’s Q index. 
 
The analyses confirm the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship between the share of 
explorative technological activities and financial performance. In addition, it is observed that 
most sample firms do not reach the optimal level of explorative technological activities. These 
findings point to the relevance of creating a balance between exploitation and exploration in the 
context of technological activities. Moreover, they suggest that, for the majority of R&D 
intensive firms, reaching such a balance between exploration and exploitation implies investing 
additional efforts and resources in exploring new knowledge domains. The analyses also show 
that firms, engaging more intensively in collaboration, perform relatively stronger in explorative 
activities. At the same time, a negative relationship between the share of collaborative 
technological activities and a firm’s market value is observed. Contrary to our expectations, it is 
collaboration in explorative technological activities, rather than collaboration in exploitative 
technological activities, that leads to a reduction in firm value. These findings question the 
relevance of open business models for technological activities. In particular, they suggest that the 
potential advantages of collaboration for (explorative) technological activities (i.e. access to 
complementary knowledge from other partners, sharing of technological costs and risks) might 
not compensate for the potential disadvantages, such as the incurred increase in coordination 
costs and the need to share innovation rewards across innovation partners. 
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INTRODUCTION 
March (1991) made an explicit distinction between exploration and exploitation. Exploitation 
refers to the leveraging of existing capabilities by means of activities such as standardization, 
upscaling and refinement. Exploration refers to the creation of new capabilities by means of 
activities such as fundamental research, experimentation, and search. This 
exploration/exploitation dichotomy has been used in a wide range of research domains. The 
central tenet of this literature is that firms benefit from a balanced mix of exploration and 
exploitation activities, and that firms, that are able to combine both activities effectively, 
improve their survival chances and performance (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Raisch et al., 
2009). Although several studies have examined the impact of ambidexterity on innovation 
outcomes, remarkably few studiesi have examined the ultimate effect on firms’ financial 
performance. 
At the same time, firms balance internal technological activities and externally oriented 
technological activities through external sourcing and collaboration with external partners 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Hence, firms can position themselves 
differently in terms of (i) the degree of exploration and (ii) the extent of external partner 
involvement (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). The financial 
performance consequences of such positioning decisions is an important managerial issue, but 
has not been the subject of prior analysis.ii  
In this article, the impact of collaborative versus solitary technological activities and 
exploitative versus explorative technological activities on the market value of firms is examined. 
Specifically, the focus is on technological activities as reflected in patent applications. 
Technological activities lie at the core of wealth creation in high-technology industries and have 
been shown to contribute substantially to the financial performance of firms (e.g. Ernst, 2001; 
Narin et al., 1987, Scherer, 1965; Hall et al, 2005). Explorative technological activities are 
defined as the development of ideas situated in technological domains where the firm has not 
patented in the past five years. In contrast, exploitative technological activities are acts of 
creation in technological domains where the firm has patented technology in the previous five 
years. Collaborative technological activities are reflected by the presence of patents assigned 
simultaneously to the focal firm and an external partner organization.  
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Organisational learning theory and the literature on technology alliances is used as 
theoretical background to derive the main hypotheses of the article. Specifically, the focus is on 
the potential differentiated impact of the intensity of collaboration in explorative and exploitative 
technological activities. The broad literature on strategic technology alliances indicates that 
collaborative R&D can facilitate access to technologies developed by partners and that sharing of 
resources and capabilities may open up new technological trajectories (e.g. Doz & Hamel, 1997; 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Teece, 1986). Hence, R&D collaboration can be seen as particularly useful for 
technology exploration and entry into new technologies. Collaborations drawing strongly on the 
existing technology bases and the core capabilities of firms may, on the other hand, carry the risk 
of dissipation of essential knowledge and hence appear subject to more critical governance 
issues.  
Hypotheses are tested on a panel dataset (1996-2003) of 168 US, European and Japanese 
R&D-intensive firms active in the chemical, pharmaceutical, non-electrical machinery, 
electronics, and IT industries. In line with recent research by Uotila et al. (2009), the analyses 
confirm the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship between the share of explorative 
technological activities and firms’ market value. At the same time, a negative relationship 
between the share of collaborative technological activities and the market value of firms is 
observed. This result suggests that value appropriation complexities introduced when engaging 
in collaborative technological activities may exceed their value-enhancing potential. Finally, 
whereas firms that are more intensively engaged in collaboration display higher levels of 
exploration technological activities, the share of collaboration in explorative technological 
activities has the strongest negative impact on the market value of firms.  
This article is structured in four sections. First, a distinction is made between different 
kinds of technological activities relying on the existing organizational learning and technology 
alliances literature; and hypotheses are formulated regarding the financial performance 
implications of these activities. Subsequently, the methodology of the article is discussed, 
followed by an overview of the main results. Finally, the theoretical and managerial implications 
of the article are discussed, limitations are mentioned and suggestions for future research are 
made.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A Typology of Invention Activities 
This article focuses on technological activities and their impact on the financial performance of 
firms. Organizational learning scholars (March, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993) have made an 
explicit distinction between exploration and exploitation. Exploitation refers to the leveraging of 
existing capabilities by means of activities such as standardization, scaling and refinement. 
Exploration refers to the creation of new capabilities by engaging in fundamental research, 
experimentation, and search. This exploration/exploitation dichotomy has been used in a variety 
of research domains including strategic management (e.g. He and Wong, 2004; Uotila et al., 
2009); innovation management (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Jansen, Van den Bosch & 
Volberda, 2006), alliances (e.g. Faems, Van Looy & Debackere, 2005; Koza & Lewin, 1998; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), technology sourcing (e.g. Schildt, Maula & Keil, 2005; Rothaermel 
& Alexandre, 2009) and organizational design (e,g, Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004; Lubatkin, et al., 2006). In this article, a distinction is made between explorative 
and exploitative technological activities. Explorative activities are defined as the development of 
ideas that are situated in technological domains where the firm has not patented technology 
during the past five years. In contrast, exploitative technological activities are defined as acts of 
creation in technological domains where the firm has patented technology in the previous five 
years. 
 Numerous scholars (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) have 
emphasized that technological activities do not have to be situated exclusively within the 
boundaries of the firm. Instead, firms can choose to engage in collaboration with different kinds 
of partner to develop new ideas. Von Hippel, Thomke and Sonnack (1999), for instance, 
emphasize the relevance of collaborating with lead users to generate new ideas. Other scholars 
(Belderbos, Carree and Lokshin, 2004, Faems, Van Looy & Debackere, 2005; Santoro, 2000; 
Sherwood & Covin, 2008) point to universities as valuable partners to engage in joint idea 
creation activities. In addition, Browning, Beyer and Shetler (1995) describe how consortia of 
competitors have contributed to the emergence of breakthrough inventions in the semi-conductor 
industry. In this article, an explicit distinction is therefore made between solitary technological 
activities and collaborative technological activities. 
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 In sum, technological activities are classified along two different dimensions: 1) 
explorative versus exploitative technological activities, and 2) solitary versus collaborative 
technological activities. Combining these two dimensions results in a typology of four different 
kinds of technological activities: 1) solitary exploitative technological activities; 2) solitary 
explorative technological activities; 3) collaborative exploitative technological activities; and 4) 
collaborative explorative technological activities (see Figure 1). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Hypotheses on the Financial Performance Implications of Different Invention Activities 
In the following paragraphs, hypotheses on the financial performance effects of the two 
identified dimensions of technological activities are developed. First, the effects of the 
exploration/exploitation dichotomy and the solitary/collaborative dichotomy on the financial 
performance of the firm are discussed. Subsequently, the two dimensions are combined to 
develop hypotheses on the financial performance effects of collaborative exploitative 
technological activities (versus solitary exploitative technological activities) and collaborative 
explorative technological activities (versus solitary explorative technological activities). 
 
Impact of Explorative and Exploitative Technological Activities on Financial Performance  
Several scholars (e.g. He & Wong, 2004; March & Levinthal, 1993; McGrath, 2001; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996; Jansen et al, 2006) argue that a central concern of corporate strategy relates to 
decisions on how to divide attention and resources between explorative and exploitative 
activities within firms. Focusing on exploitative activities is likely to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of existing core capabilities, which can lead to positive short-term effects. March 
and Levinthal (1993) suggest however that an exploitation focus can trigger a success trap in 
which exploitation drives out exploration. In this way, existing core capabilities can turn into 
core rigidities, which compromise the ability of the firm to adequately respond to forthcoming 
industrial and/or technological changes and thereby threatens the long-term survival of the firm 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). At the same time, it is recognized that 
focusing solely on exploration can be detrimental to the firm’s financial performance. In order to 
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realize growth and profit, focus and commitment are required (Ghemawat, 1992).  Relying solely 
on exploration might even result in a reinforcing cycle in which ‘failure leads to search and 
change, which leads to failure, which leads to more search and so on’ (Levinthal & March, 1993: 
105-106). It is therefore argued that companies able to establish a balance between exploration 
and exploitation are likely to outperform firms that focus solely on either exploration or 
exploitation.  
He and Wong (2004) were the first to test this ‘ambidexterity hypothesis’ (Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). They found a positive interaction effect between explorative and exploitative 
strategies on a firm’s sales growth, while the relative imbalance between explorative and 
exploitative innovation strategies was negatively related to growth. A recent study by Uotila et 
al. (2009) provides further evidence of the need to balance exploration and exploitation. 
Conducting computer-assisted coding of firms’ publicly available documents, they found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the relative share of the firm’s exploration orientation 
and market valuation.  
Based on these arguments, one may expect that firms seek a balance between exploration 
and exploitation in their technological activities. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: An inverted U-shape relationship exists between the relative share of 
explorative technological activities in a firm’s technology portfolio and its financial 
performance. 
  
Impact of Solitary and Collaborative Technological Activities on Financial Performance 
Technology collaboration enables firms to scan their environment for new windows of 
opportunity and promising new technologies; it is often used as an instrument to acquire 
technological knowledge and to develop new skills that reside within the partnering companies 
(Hamel, 1991; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Powell, Kaput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Conditions of technological risk are the norm when it comes to developing new ideas (Hill & 
Rothaermel, 2003). In addition, the costs of technological activities are steadily increasing in 
many technology fields (Teece, 2002). Engaging in inter-firm collaboration has been suggested as 
a viable approach in seeking to address these issues. Bringing together different partners 
increases the amount of available human and physical resources to develop new ideas, which is 
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likely to decrease technological risk (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007; Hagedoorn, 1993). Collaborative 
arrangements also facilitate the spreading of R&D costs among various partners (Harrigan, 1988; 
Veugelers, 1998).  
 Collaboration may not only reduce the risk and costs of technological activities, it may 
also increase the probability of their successful realization. Technological activities increasingly 
require the incorporation of a wide range of knowledge components into complex systems and 
integrated solutions (Teece, 2002). However, as the range of knowledge to be integrated widens, 
mastering and combining these different kinds of knowledge is increasingly difficult for single 
firms to handle (Doz & Hamel, 1997). Numerous scholars have stressed the advantages of inter-
firm collaboration in this respect. First, collaborative arrangements might imply access to 
complementary assets required to turn technological activities into success (Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Teece, 1986). Second, working together with other organizations might encourage the transfer of 
codified and tacit knowledge, resulting in the creation and development of ideas that would be 
difficult to realize in isolation (Doz & Hamel, 1997; Faems, Janssens & Van Looy, 2007; 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). A range of previous studies has confirmed that 
technology collaboration – in particular, a portfolio of strategic technology alliances – can have a 
positive impact on the innovative performance of companies (e.g. Baum and Oliver, 1991; 
Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr , 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004)iii.  
In sum, the above arguments suggest that, in comparison with solitary technological 
activities, collaborative technological activities might imply lower technical risks and costs 
whilst at the same time introducing a higher probability of success. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: A greater share of collaborative technological activities in a firm’s 
technology portfolio increases its financial performance.  
 
 Although collaborative arrangements might reduce technical risks and costs, engaging in 
collaboration with external partners might, on the other hand, introduce relational risks and an 
increase in required coordination costs. Engaging in collaboration suggests the potential risk that 
the other partner may engage in opportunistic behaviour such as ‘cheating, shirking, distorting 
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information, misleading partners, providing substandard products/services, and appropriating 
partners’ critical resources’ (Das & Teng, 1998: 492). Mitigating such risks may require time-
consuming contract negotiations and/or the implementation of costly monitoring mechanisms 
(Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1985). In addition, the presence of cultural and organizational 
differences among collaborating partners would suggest that achieving coordinated action in 
such settings is not a straightforward task. As a result, it may be necessary to make relational 
investments that facilitate coordination among collaborating partners (Faems et al., 2008; Gulati 
& Singh, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998).   
 In contrast to solitary technological activities, collaborative activities implies that firms 
also need to share the rewards with their collaborating partners. In other words, collaboration 
might increase the probability of generating ideas successfully but may substantially restrict the 
ability of the focal firm to appropriate the value of such activities (Lavie, Lechner & Singh, 
2007; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Based on these potential disadvantages of collaborative 
technological activities, the following competing hypothesis is formulated: 
 
 Hypothesis 2b: A greater share of collaborative technological activities in a firm’s 
technology  portfolio decreases its financial performance.  
 
Exploration and exploitation; jointly or separately?  
Previous research provides strong indications that the preference for, and the impact of, solitary 
or collaborative approaches might be different in exploitative and explorative settings. Several 
scholars (Das & Teng, 2000; Hagedoorn & Dusters, 2002) argue the more that technological 
activities are essential for the existing core business of a firm, the more a firm wishes to exert 
full control over such activities. According to transaction cost theory (e.g. Pisano, 1990; 
Williamson, 1991), such full control can best be achieved by internalizing technological 
activities. Additionally, the economic consequences of opportunistic behaviour in collaborative 
arrangements are likely to be higher in exploitative than in explorative settings. If the partner 
firm uses valuable knowledge obtained from the existing knowledge domains of the focal firm, 
the economic damage is likely to be higher than when there are unintended knowledge spillovers 
in knowledge domains that do not constitute the core technology of current business activities.  
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Looking at collaborative technological activities from a resource-based perspective, the 
value-generating properties of collaboration are expected to be higher for explorative 
technological activities than for exploitative technological activities. Exploitative technological 
activities refer to the generation of new ideas within the existing knowledge domains of the firm. 
It can be expected that, internally, the firm will have the necessary knowledge, skills and 
expertise to successfully accomplish such a task. Ahuja (2000) argues that firms have little 
inducement to engage in collaboration in fields where they already possess particular strengths. 
In contrast, explorative technological activities, or the development of ideas in new knowledge 
domains, are likely to require knowledge, skills and expertise that are not present within the firm. 
It is the combination of a diversity of resources that holds out the promise of building up new 
valuable and scare technological resources, which in turn build competitive advantage in the 
future (Hamel, 1991; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 1996). Based on the 
above arguments, the following two hypotheses are formulated 
 
Hypothesis 3a: A greater share of collaboration in a firm’s exploitative technological 
activities decreases its financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: A greater share of collaboration in a firm’s explorative technological 
activities increases its financial performance. 
 
DATA  
Sample and Data 
The impact of different kinds of technological activities on the financial performance of firms is 
investigated using a panel dataset (1996-2003) on the technological activities of 168 sample 
firms. The sample firms are R&D-intensive European, US and Japanese firms in five industries: 
(i) non-electrical machinery, (ii) pharmaceuticals & biotechnology; (iii) chemicals; (iv) IT 
hardware (computers and communication equipment); and (v) electronics & electrical 
machinery. The firms are drawn from the 2004 EU industrial R&D investment scoreboard, 
which provides listings of the 500 most R&D-intensive European, and 500 most R&D-intensive 
US and Japanese firms across all industries. The resulting sample of 168 firms contains roughly 
the same number of firms in each industry for each region of origin.  
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Patent data are used to construct indicators of firms’ technological activities. There are 
numerous advantages to the use of patent indicators (Pavitt, 1985; Basberg, 1987; Griliches, 
1990; Hall et al, 2005): patent documents contain highly detailed information on content and 
ownership of patented technology; they cover a broad range of technologies; patent data are 
‘objective’ in the sense that they have been processed and validated by patent examiners; and 
patent data are publicly available. Like any indicator, patents are also subject to a number of 
drawbacks: not all technological activities are patented; patent propensities vary across firms and 
industriesiv; and patented technological activities differ in their technical and economical value 
(Levin et al, 1987; Mansfield, 1986; Gambardella et al, 2008). Despite these shortcomings, no 
other indicator provides the same level of detail of the technological activities of firms as do 
patents (Griliches, 1990).  
Firm patent data is collected at the consolidated level: i.e. all patents of the parent firm 
and its consolidated (majority-ownedv) subsidiaries are collected. For this purpose, lists of 
subsidiaries included in corporate annual reports, 10-K reports filed with the SEC in the US and, 
for Japanese firms, information on foreign subsidiaries published by Toyo Keizai in the yearly 
‘Directories of Japanese Overseas Investments’, are used. The consolidation is conducted on an 
annual basis (1996-2003) to take into account changes in the group structure of the firms over 
time. Using consolidated patent data is important in order to obtain a complete picture of the 
technological activities of firms since a significant proportion of firms’ patents are not filed 
under the parent firm name. For the sample, on average 17.6% of firm patents are filed under the 
name of firm subsidiaries or name variants of the parent firms.  
In this article, patent data from the European Patent Office (EPO) is used. European 
patent data was preferred to the more commonly used data from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) because EPO patents are, typically, considered to provide a better 
indication of valuable technological activities: the cost of patenting is two to five times greater at 
EPO than at USPTO; the workload of patent examiners is four times smaller at EPO than at 
USPTO; and EPO has a 20-30% lower patent-granting rate than USPTO (Van Pottelsberghe de 
la Potterie and François, 2006; Quillen and Webster, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). The 
explanatory variables are constructed from patent application data. Whereas patent grants are 
better indicators of firms’ successful technological activities, patent application data provide a 
broader indicator of the variety of technological activities of the firm. The use of patent 
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applications tends to result in a more complete picture of firms’ technological activities, 
especially in the case of explorative activities. Moreover, patent-granting decisions in the 
European Patent Office, our source of patent data, take 5-6 years on average vi, making patent 
grants a poor (incomplete) indicator of firms’ recent technological activities. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the annual (1996-2003) financial performance of a firm, measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm and the replacement (book) value 
of the firm’s assets. A firm’s market value is defined as the sum of market capitalization (share 
price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the year), preferred 
stock, minority interests, and total debt minus cash. In contrast to current profit indicators (e.g. 
sales, net profits, ROA), Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking indicator that contains an assessmentvii 
of firms’ future financial results from current technological activities. This forward-looking 
aspect is important since returns from technological activities often only become manifest 
several years after the activities have taken place (Czarnitzki, Hall and Oriani, 2006). 
Information on the market and book value of firms is collected from financial databases 
(Worldscope and Compustat) and firms’ annual reports. 
 
Typology of Invention Activities 
Patent indicators are used to develop a typology of firms’ technological activities. All firm 
patents are classified into one of four categories using two dimensions: (1) explorative versus 
exploitative technological activities, and (2) solitary versus collaborative technological activities 
(Figure 1).  
Technology class information is used to make a distinction between explorative and 
exploitative patents. The European Patent Office classifies all patents into at least one technology 
field, using the International Patent Classification System (IPC)viii. The IPC system classifies the 
technology landscape into 628 IPC-4 digit classes (used in the study) and several ten-thousands 
of subclasses nested within these classes. A patent is considered as an explorative one when it is 
situated in a technology domain that is new or unfamiliar to the firm (i.e. a technology in which 
the firm lacks prior experience). A technology domain is defined as new to a firm in year t, if the 
firm (i.e. firm subsidiaries in year t) did not patent in the technology domain in the past five 
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years (t-5 to t-1). The choice of a five-year window to assess familiarity with technology 
domains is based on the observation that technical knowledge evolves rapidly in most 
technology fields, losing most of its technical and economical relevance within five years (Ahuja 
and Lampert, 2001; Hall et al, 2005; Leten et al, 2007). Since a technology domain remains 
relatively new and unexplored immediately after a firm embarks on technological activities, a 
technology domain keeps its explorative status for a period of three consecutive years.  
Information on the ownership structure of patents is used to differentiate between 
solitary-owned and collaborative patents. A patent is considered as a collaborative one when it is 
jointly owned with an economic actor that is not part of the consolidated focal firm (another 
firm, university, public research institute etc.). Patents that are jointly owned by firms and 
individual persons have been excluded since one does not know whether these individuals are 
employed by the focal firm or not. Patent applicant names referring to individual persons are 
identified by patent allocation algorithms (source: Van Looy et al, 2006).    
In total, 170,510 patents (belonging to the 168 sample firms for the period 1996-2003) 
have been classified along two dimensions. The majority of patents are classified as solitary 
exploitation (90.1%), followed by solitary exploration (6.5%), collaborative exploitation (2.9%) 
and collaborative exploration (0.5%) (Figure 2)ix. In Figures 3 and 4, a longitudinal perspective 
is followed by calculating the technology typology matrices for two subsequent four-year periods 
(1996-99; 2000-03). Figures 3 and 4 show a decline in the overall share of exploration patents 
over time (from 7.9% to 6.5%), whereas the share of collaboration patents has remained 
relatively stable over time (around 3.3-3.5%).  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2, 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Technology typology matrices are calculated annually (1996-2003) for all sample firms. 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, a variable that reflects the share of collaboration in a firm’s 
technology portfolio is created. To test Hypothesis 2a and 2b, a variable reflecting the share of 
collaboration in technological activities is constructed. To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, two 
additional variables are calculated reflecting (1) the share of collaboration in exploitative 
technological activities and (2) the share of collaboration in explorative technological activities. 
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Control Variables 
Several variables that might influence the financial performance of firms are introduced as 
control variables in the analyses. First, two indicators for the size of firms’ current technological 
activities are included: R&D intensity (R&D expenditures/total assets) and patent propensity 
(patents/R&D expenses). Firms that spend more money on technological activities (R&D 
intensity) and are more successful in these activities (patent propensity) are expected to realize a 
higher market valuation. This assertion has been confirmed by prior studies relating the stock 
market value of firms to measures of the size of their technological activities (Griliches, 1981; 
Pakes, 1985; Blundell et al, 1999; Hall et al, 2005; Czarnitzki, Hussinger and Leten, 2009). 
Second, a set of dummy variables are included to control for industry differences (five sectors). 
Firms belonging to different sectors face different competitive pressures and opportunities, 
which may translate into performance differences. Third, region (US, Japan, and 11 European 
countries) and year (1996-2003) dummies are included to control for differences in macro-
economic trends across time and countries that may impact on the stock market valuation of 
firms. Finally, a one-year lagged value of Tobin’s Q is included as an additional variable in line 
with the work of Griliches (1981). This will control for anyresidual unobserved heterogeneity 
across firms leading to systematic differences in market valuations. It has the advantage that one 
can rely on contemporaneous measures of the technological activity variables to examine their 
impact on market valuation, as previous technological activities are already reflected in the 
lagged value of q. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows sample statistics for the main variables used in the analyses (1138 observations). 
In line with prior studies (Hall et al, 2005 & 2006), Tobin’s Q and measures of the size of firms’ 
technological activities (R&D/assets; patents/R&D) are highly skewed. There is also 
considerable variance in the exploration and collaboration variables, with standard errors of the 
same order or exceeding mean values. This suggests that there is sufficient room for ‘action’ in 
the model variables. The (average) share of collaboration in explorative technological activities 
is larger (7.83%) than the (average) share of collaboration in exploitative technological activities 
(4.75%). This observation seem to confirm previous studies (e.g. Folta, 1998; Hagedoorn & 
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Duysters, 2002), arguing that collaborative approaches are more relevant in explorative settings 
than in exploitative settings.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 contains the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables of interest. As 
expected, Tobin’s Q correlates strongly with its lagged value, and the correlation between share 
of exploration and its squared term is considerable. Again as expected, a strong correlation 
between share of collaboration, on the one hand, and share of collaboration in 
exploitation/exploration, is found on the other hand. Separate models are therefore used to test 
the impact of these variables. The correlations between the other independent variables are not 
excessively high. 
 
 
RESULTS 
The results of the models explaining the impact of different kinds of technological activities on 
the financial performance of firms are reported in Table 3. Regressions have been estimated by 
ordinary least squares techniques, with robust standard errors clustered at the parent firm level. A 
lagged dependent variable is included in all regression models to control for the impact of 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.  
Model 1 includes the control variables and a lagged dependent variable. The lagged 
dependent variable, R&D intensity and patent propensity variables have the expected positive 
signs and are significant, using conservative 2-tailed tests. In Model 2, the linear and quadratic 
terms of ‘exploration share’ are added. Exploration share has a positive and significant linear 
term, and a negative and significant quadratic term. These results confirm Hypothesis 1: there is 
an inverted U-shape relationship between the share of explorative technological activities and a 
firm’s financial performance. Firms with moderate exploration shares outperform both firms 
with low and high exploration shares. In other words, the best performing firms maintain a 
healthy balance of explorative and exploitative technological activities. The peak of the inverted 
U-curve occurs at a value of 39% for ‘exploration share’, with 87% of the sample observations 
having smaller (and 13% larger) values than the peak value. This implies that most sample firms 
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can further increase their financial performance by increasing the share of explorative activities 
in their technology portfolios.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The ‘collaboration share’ variable is added in Model 3. This variable has a negative and 
significant coefficient, while the coefficients of the other variables remain largely unchanged. 
This disconfirms Hypothesis 2a and confirms Hypothesis 2b: a greater share of collaborative 
technological activities in a firm’s technology portfolio decreases its financial performance. 
These findings suggest that the relational costs and value appropriation disadvantages of 
collaborative technological activities may outweigh the technological savings and value 
realization advantages of such activities. 
In Model 4, the impact of the collaboration share in exploitative and explorative 
technological activities on firms’ financial performance are compared. No significant effect of 
the share of collaboration in exploitative technological activities on the financial performance of 
firms is found. In other words, the data suggest that, in terms of financial performance, there is 
no differential impact of conducting exploitative technological activities in isolation or in 
collaboration with other partners. At the same time, a significant effect of the collaboration share 
in explorative technological activities on financial performance is found. However, in contrast to 
expectations, this effect proves to be negative: a greater share of collaboration in a firm’s total 
explorative technological activities significantly lowers the financial performance. These results 
indicate that, in comparison with solitary explorative technological activities, the added value of 
collaborative explorative technological activities to the future economic profits of the firm is 
negatively assessed by financial markets. In other words, the potential advantages of 
collaboration for explorative technological activities (i.e. access to complementary knowledge 
from other partners, sharing of technological costs and risks) appear not to compensate for the 
potential disadvantages (i.e. need to share the future benefits of the technological activities with 
external partners and/or additional relational costs of engaging in explorative collaboration).  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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 The unexpected negative relationship between firm value and the intensity of 
collaboration in explorative technological activities led us to explore the relationship between 
exploration and collaboration in further detail. In particular, the correlations, reported in Table 2, 
indicate that a greater intensity of collaboration in exploration is positively correlated with a 
greater share of exploration in technological activities, which can be seen to point to positive 
effects from explorative collaboration. This relationship is examined more formally, based on the 
working hypothesis that engaging in collaboration may help firms to increase their explorative 
technological activities. For that purpose, an additional analyses is conducted in which the 
impact of the share of collaboration in exploration in year t-1 on the total share of exploration in 
a firm’s technology portfolio in year t is examined, controlling for the initial exploration 
intensity (t-1), sector, country, and year effects. The results are presented in Table 4 and show a 
significantly positive effect of collaborative exploration on the share of explorative activity.  As 
most of the sample firms (i.e. 87%) have not achieved their optimal exploration level, an increase 
in exploration indirectly also implies an increase in the financial performance of these firms. In 
sum, whereas a negative direct effect of the collaboration share in explorative technological 
activities on firms’ financial performance is found, there are also indications of a positive 
indirect effect of this variable (via an increasing share of exploration activities) on the firm’s 
financial performance.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES 
In this section, the main findings of the article and their implications are discussed. In addition, 
some limitations of the article are mentioned and avenues for future research are identified.  
 
Toward a Balanced Innovation Strategy 
Numerous scholars (e.g. March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
Jansen, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2006) have emphasized the importance of a balance 
between explorative and exploitative activities for the long-term performance and survival of the 
firm. The findings of this article contribute to this literature in different ways. First, this research 
is expanded into the setting of technological activities, and an explicit distinction between 
explorative and exploitative technological activities is made by drawing on detailed technology 
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class information on firms’ patents. Second, although previous research has emphasized the 
advantages of a balanced strategy, large-scale, quantitative empirical research that examined the 
performance implications of such a strategy has remained scarce. The recent study by Uotila et 
al. (2009) is an exception in this respect. They provided first evidence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the share of exploration in a firm’s corporate actions and a firm’s market 
value. This article provides additional evidence for such a relationship in the context of 
technological activities. An inverted U-shape relationship between the share of explorative 
technological activities and the market value of the firm is found. Hereby, it has been observed 
that most firms in the sample did not yet reach the optimal level of explorative technological 
activities. In sum, these findings points to the relevance of creating a balance between 
exploitation and exploration in the context of technological activities. In addition, the findings 
suggest that, for the majority of R&D intensive firms, reaching a healthy balance between 
exploration and exploitation implies investing additional efforts and resources in exploring new 
knowledge domains. 
 
Toward Open Innovation Practices? 
Based on close observation of a relatively small number of companies, Chesbrough (2003) 
advanced an innovation paradigm shift from closed to more open innovation models. Open 
innovation is characterized by the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to both 
accelerate internal innovation and expand the markets for external use of innovation. Numerous 
companies (i.e. IBM, Intel, P&G) have begun to adopt the concept of open innovation. In 
addition, academic research on open innovation is proliferating (Chesbrough et al., 2006). While 
a broad range of studies has examined the impact of technology alliances on various performance 
measures, studies making an explicit distinction between explorative and exploitative types of 
activities have been limited. The study by Laursen and Salter (2005) is an exception in this 
respect. Examining sources of technological knowledge used by firms in the innovation process, 
Laursen and Salter (2005) find that searching widely and deeply is curvilinearly related to firms’ 
innovation performance. In this article, further insights into the extent to which firms adopt 
collaborative strategies of an explorative or exploitative kind, and how such strategies relate to 
firm value, are generated. 
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In a recent study, Poot et al. (2009) provide evidence that innovating firms in the late 
1990s and early years of the new millennium have increasingly relied on external sources of 
information for innovation, while they have increasingly engaged in formal collaboration with 
external partners to support their innovation activities. Data on 168 top R&D spending firms in 
five technology-intensive industries used in this study, however, do not provide indications for 
such an increasing trend with respect to collaborative technological activities. In particular, no 
increase in co-patenting rates was observed when the periods 1996-1999 and 2000-2003 were 
compared. In other words, the data of this article did not provide evidence for the emergence of a 
paradigm shift with respect to technological activities and, more specifically, resulting patent 
applications, during the observed period. 
This study also shows that the share of collaborative technological activities relates 
negatively to the market value of the firm. Moreover, contrary to our expectations, it is the share 
of collaboration in explorative technological activities rather than the share of collaboration in 
exploitative technological activities that leads to a reduction in firm value. Although these results 
are surprising, they do echo some of the findings on the drawbacks of intensive use of 
technology collaboration. It has been argued that embeddedness in existing technology 
partnerships can create a dependence that increases the risk of firms falling into a familiarity 
trap, reducing true experimentation (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Intensive use of collaboration may 
lead management attention and integration costs to grow exponentially, and a firm’s 
effectiveness at managing its alliances will decline with the number of alliances it maintains 
(Deeds and Hill, 1996). Other scholars (Belderbos et al., 2006, Faems et al., 2009, Knudsen, 
2007) provide further evidence that the diversity of a firm’s technology alliance portfolio (i.e. the 
extent to which a firm simultaneously collaborates with different kinds of partners to support its 
innovation strategies) can have negative effects on firms’ performance.  
These findings suggest that the potential advantages of collaboration for (explorative) 
technological activities (i.e. access to complementary knowledge from other partners, sharing of 
technological costs and risks) might not compensate for the potential disadvantages, such as the 
incurred increase in coordination costs. At the same time, the collaboration indicator used in this 
study – co-patents – does not permit us to arrive at final conclusions on the level of the financial 
impact of open innovation practices, as co-patents only reflect a fraction of the firm’s 
collaborative relationships. Indeed, collaborative R&D efforts will not always result in a patent 
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application and, even if patent applications emerge from joint R&D efforts, co-owned 
applications are not a necessity. What co-patents do however signal is a willingness to remain a 
stakeholder during the further development of the invented technology towards commercial 
exploitation. Consequently, co-patents seem also to be a relevant indicator for signalling the 
occurrence of open business models (Chesbrough, 2006). From this perspective, our findings 
suggest that when the fruits of collaborative technological activities have to be shared with 
partner firms – resulting in a likely reduction in potential future revenues flowing to the focal 
firm compared with the situation of full ownership –  the market value of the firm may be 
negatively affected. One possible explanation for the strong negative impact of collaboration in 
exploration – rather than exploitation –   activities might reside in the fact that explorative 
technological activities are assessed (by financial markets) to be more valuable than exploitative 
activities. Therefore, the discount of sharing revenues in case of co-patenting is larger for 
explorative than exploitative technological activities. Additional support for this argument may 
be provided by the fact that a high peak value for the curvilinear curve of the exploration share 
variable is found in Table 3, which most sample firms did not yet reach. 
Finally, it should be noted that, in a subsequent analysis, a positive relationship between 
collaboration in explorative activities and the total share of exploration in technological activities 
is found, which in turn has a positive effect on the financial performance of firms. These findings 
confirm the relevance of collaborative efforts in improving the firm’s technological performance. 
At the same time, taken jointly, these findings signal the presence of a complex balancing act 
with respect to collaboration since technological and economical benefits do not seem to 
coincide – and even result in counterbalancing effects.  
 
Limitations and Further Research 
One limitation of this study relates to the use of co-patenting information to derive measures of 
collaborative technological activities, since not all collaborations will be captured by co-
patenting indicators. First, not all collaborative R&D efforts will result in an application for a 
patent. Second, even if R&D collaboration yields a patent application, specific IP arrangements 
between the partners involved might result in patent applications from only one partner. This 
means that the collaboration variables used in the analysis should be viewed as a conservative 
estimation of the amount of collaboration taking place, with actual levels of collaborative 
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technological activities being higher. Engaging in future research that incorporates additional 
indicators of collaboration seems highly relevant to further assess and corroborate the robustness 
of the findings of this article.  
At the same time, it is clear that the occurrence of co-patents in itself signals a clear 
intention of both partners to remain involved in subsequent development and exploitation efforts. 
To the extent that such open business models imply joint efforts entrenched in appropriate IP 
arrangements, as reflected in cross-licensing and co-patenting, these findings signal important 
managerial points of attention. If open innovation models do not translate into additional firm 
value, one can and should question their relevance and sustainability. Future research examining 
the conditions that affect the actual occurrence of such value-creating dynamics, or that at least 
allow us to avoid the observed direct negative effect, seems highly appropriate. Further in-depth 
analysis of the relative importance of the observed direct (negative) effect of inventive 
collaboration, and the positive indirect performance effects through increasing the exploration 
orientation of firms, constitutes an important avenue for future research. One could state that 
avoiding the direct negative impact of collaboration on firm value holds the key to installing and 
developing open innovation practices of a sustainable nature. Hopefully the research findings 
reported in this article will inspire engagement in future investigation of these issues.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Min Max St.Dev 
Q 1.7358 0.1617 20.299 1.8925 
R&D/Assets 0.0608 0.0044 0.5172 0.0453 
Patents/R&D 0.2851 0.0004 1.9132 0.2775 
Exploration Share 0.1946 0.0053 0.9000 0.1801 
Collaboration Share 0.0531 0 0.6666 0.0787 
Collaboration Share in Exploitation 0.0475 0 1 0.0954 
Collaboration Share in Exploration 0.0783 0 1 0.1595 
 Note: Statistics for the ‘patents/R&D’ variable are multiplied by a factor of 1000 
 
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Model Variables 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Q 1
(2) Lagged Q 0.86 1
(3) R&D/assets 0.45 0.44 1
(4) Patents/R&D -0.10 -0.10 -0.29 1
(5) Exploration Share -0.06 -0.07 -0.16 -0.1 1
(6) Exploration Share2 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 0.94 1
(7) Collaboration Share -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 0.22 0.24 1
(8) Collaboration Share in Exploitation -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 0.16 0.20 0.77 1
(9) Collaboration Share in Exploration -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.60 0.21 1
 
Note: The variables Q and ‘lagged Q’ are logarithmic transformed 
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Table 3: Financial Performance as Function of Firms’ Technological Activities 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Lagged Q 0.7823** 0.7803** 0.7783** 0.7779** 
 (0.0251) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245) 
R&D/Assets 1.1312* 1.2112** 1.1832** 1.2000** 
 (0.4403) (0.4591) (0.4462) (0.4529) 
Patents/R&D 103.6914** 111.8669** 104.3651** 107.5966** 
 (36.1688) (36.0735) (35.0018) (34.9454) 
Exploration Share  0.4305* 0.4238* 0.4124* 
  (0.1721) (0.1732) (0.1738) 
Exploration Share2  -0.5435* -0.4757* -0.4902* 
  (0.2313) (0.2364) (0.2412) 
Collaboration Share   -0.3717**  
   (0.1338)  
Collaboration Share in  
Exploitation   -0.1001 
    (0.1037) 
Collaboration Share in 
Exploration    -0.1293* 
    (0.0563) 
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.1718** 0.1292* 0.1544** 0.1477* 
  (0.0538) (0.0565) (0.0569) (0.0573) 
Number of Observations 1138 1138 1138 1138 
Number of Firms 168 168 168 168 
R-Squared 0.808 0.809 0.810 0.810 
Notes: Only observations with exploitation patents and exploration patents>0 (1138 obs) are included; Dependent 
variable = log Tobin’s Q; Clustered standard errors at firm level;  *,** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent 
level.  
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Table 4: Exploration Share as function of  Collaboration Share in Exploration Activities 
 
  Model 5 
Lagged Exploration Share 0.5592** 
 (0.0322) 
Collaboration Share in Exploration (lagged) 0.0890* 
 (0.0409) 
Sector Dummies YES 
Country Dummies YES 
Year Dummies  YES 
Constant 0.0444** 
  (0.0139) 
Number of Observations 1138 
Number of Firms 168 
R-Squared 0.5370 
Notes: Only observations with exploitation patents and exploration patents>0 (1138 obs) are included; dependent 
variable = Exploration Share; Clustered standard errors at firm level;  *,** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent 
level.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Different Kinds of Technological Activities in the Technology Portfolio 
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Figure 2: Technology Typology Matrix (Patents in Period 1996-2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
Figure 3: Technology Typology Matrix (Patents in Period 1996-1999) 
 
 
Figure 4: Technology Typology Matrix (Patents in Period 2000-2003) 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
i
 The recent work of Uotila et al (2009) being a notable exception. 
ii
 The exception is Rothaermel and Alexandre (2009). The focus of this article is however 
primarily on the need for balance in internal and external technology sourcing.  
iii
 A notable exception is the work of Stuart (2000) who found no significant relationship   between the number of 
alliances on the innovation rate of semiconductor firms. 
iv
 As reported by Levin et al (1987) and Arundel and Kabla (1998), patent propensities are high in our five sample 
industries, making patents a meaningful indicator of firms’ technological activities in these industries. 
v
 A subsidiary is considered majority-owned if the parent firm holds at least a 50% share in the subsidiary. 
vi
 For granted patents applied in 1996, the average granting decision took 5.25 years, with 25% of grants having a 
granting lag of seven years and longer (source: own calculations) 
vii
 This assessment is made by stock markets. Hence, Tobin’s Q is only an appropriate performance measure for 
firms listed on well-functioning stock markets.  
viii
 IPC Classification version 7 is used in this article. 
ix
 The numbers in Figures 2-4 are calculated for the set of firm/year observations used in the regression analyses.  
